Prosecution of a murderous female slave, Mukden (Qing China), 1796

Chinese legal cases of the late imperial period are exceptional sources. They open unusual windows on everyday life, sometimes on its most trivial aspects. They provide a level of detail that more conventional sources would not consider worth recording. However, they are also highly standardized, even more so when produced at the upper levels of the judicial ladder (as in this case). They use a shared and predictable phraseology framed to support legal argumentations that distorts the voices of the actors and “filters” the information. Chinese judicial archives do talk about labour activities and labour relations, but never beyond the scope of the legal issue at stake, and rarely with the same level of detail available in other social and historical contexts (like private correspondence about the management of domestic staff, factory or plantation reports, slave and worker narratives, etc.).

The paradigmatic nubi

The first action phrases (Section 2) only concern those paradigmatic nubi. Crafted carefully to support the argument of the Board’s legal experts, these action phrases are important in two respects: 1. They provide historians with unusually clear explanations about the legal effects of “being sold” compared to being “manumitted” or “redeemed”; 2. In the context of this particular text, they also help establish one fact: A woman identified by others (or self-identified?) as a “maidservant” (shinü 使女, literally “a woman” “one orders”, “who is ordered”, or “who serves”) was legally a nubi. The section that describes the actual case (Section 3) is the only one where the terms nu 奴, bi 婢, or nubi 奴婢 (i.e. the legal “slave” category discussed at length in the other sections) are not used. Yet, Section 2 (and the rest of the text) makes it clear that the two “maidservants” were actually nubi (at least in a judicial context), whatever the “emic labels” used elsewhere to characterize their status, condition and functions.

The main “action phrase” in Section 2 provides no information about the possible “entry” phases into nubi status and only one reference about the “extraction” phase. The first statement simply says that becoming a nubi created a “high” level of “status differentiation”: “With regard to masters vis-à-vis their slaves, although name distinction is high […]” (yi jiazhang zhiyu nubi, mingfen sui zun 以家長之於奴婢名分雖尊). The term used here is mingfen 名分. It can be translated literally with “name distinction”, but more clearly with “status differentiation”. In the Confucian worldview, naming things was considered an essential part of ordering the world: “Denominations” (ming 名) given to people ought to reflect the reality of what they actually were, of their actual place in the hierarchical social order. For instance, when a man was given the name of “ruler” of the empire, he was expected to act as a ruler and to personify the ruler. Being a “master” or a “slave” meant that a master ought to act as a master, and a slave as a slave (meaning that they would internalize their new identities as master and slave, whose respective conducts were dictated by shared social norms). Divergences between names and reality were perceived as sources of cosmic disturbance and social disorder that would require “rectification” (“rectifying” denominations was therefore a major purpose of Confucian rites).

This part of the first action phrase does not say much about the “extraction” phase of our paradigmatic nubi. It only tells us that “name distinction” was “high” (the term employed being zun 尊, which conveys the meaning of “reverence” to someone who is of a senior generation, and by extension of upper standing or status). A low level of interpretation would lead to the conclusion that “labour” was not an essential dimension of nubi “status”. To “serve” (shi 事, a verb used later in Section 2) was inherently attached to nubi identity, but the master-slave relation was far more than a “labour” relation. This partly explains why judicial sources rarely venture into describing in details the labour performed by nubi.

As for the “exit” phases, the text discusses three legal paths out of enslavement and their “outcomes” (the social effect on the identity of the paradigmatic slave):

[…] once sold, [the bond of] solidarity is severed. Slaves who have been sold leave a master to find a new one. This is completely different from manumitted and redeemed slaves, for whom [the bonds of] benevolence and solidarity [with their former masters] remain.

(yijing zhuanmai, qi yi suijue. Gai yi beimai zhi nubi, qu yi zhu er fu yi zhu. Yu fangchu ji shushen nubi shangyou enyi weijue, jiong bu xiangtong - 經轉賣。其義隨絕。蓋以被賣之奴婢，去一主而復一主。與放出及贖身奴婢尚有恩義未絕。迥不相同).

We learn here that nubi could “exit” by “being transferred and sold” (zhuanmai 轉賣, beimai 被賣) to a new master. The outcome of this exit phase would be an immediate “re-entry” into a similar relationship that would not affect their “status”. Although this sequence (“exit” > “re-entry”) could deeply impact the actual living condition, the labour, and the way slaves were treated, the “outcome” that interests the legal experts was its effect on the relationship with the “former master”: Once sold, “[the bond of] solidarity is severed”. The term employed in this sentence is yi 義, which is usually translated with “righteousness” (in Confucian classics). We translate it with the expression “bond of solidarity” because in everyday life it had not much to do with being “righteous”. Applied to non-blood relationships, it refers to the “sense of propriety”, to “proper conduct”, i.e. acting in conformity with one’s “denomination” (an adoptive son, for instance, was named yinan 義男, i.e., a son by the bond of yi). Yi not simply required that one “acted” according to the new “name” one was given (“son” or “slave”), it also demanded that one nurtured corresponding feelings (affection, respect, gratitude, etc.), which would cement household solidarity. Thereby, for our paradigmatic nubi, the outcome of being “sold” by their master was the severing of the “bond of solidarity” (in the same way, a divorce would be termed a “severing the bond of solidarity”, yijue 義絕). To them, a “former master” would not be anything but a perfect stranger, because a slave could only serve one master (as a child had only one father).

The outcome of being manumitted (fangchu 放出, lit. “to be released and exit”) or of being allowed to redeem oneself (shushen 贖身, lit. “to redeem one’s person” or “body”), were very different. In both cases, “exit” would result in a change of identity and in increased autonomy, but not in a complete “severance” (jue 絕) of the bonds of “benevolence and solidarity” (enyi 恩義). Nubi would actually reintegrate the ranks of the “commoners”, except in their relationship with their former master. As explained later in the text (Section 5), manumission was regarded as an act of “benevolence” (en 恩) from the master, while redeeming was a unilateral (zi 自) decision made by the slave (although it rarely happened without the master’s consent in practice). Redeemed and manumitted nubi thereby remained indebted to their former master, who had not transferred their authority to another master, but had renounced to exercise it out of “benevolence” (or against a monetary compensation, which, in some cases, could be considered as having a different outcome from manumission).

In this composite document, drafted by various judicial offices, the actual story of Wu Yunzhu only occupies a few lines. Information on the successive “moments of coercion” (entry into the labour relationship, extraction of her labour and exit from the labour relationship) are only partially available (info). We are told that Wu Yunzhu was a “maidservant” (shinü 使女), but we will know nothing about how she became a maidservant (her “entry” into servitude), the labour she performed, the orders she received, how she responded to those orders, or how she felt “coerced” as a “maidservant” (the “extraction phase”). The text nonetheless provides information on the “exit” phase, not only for Wu Yunzhu, but also for another female slave, Rong Hua’er, and for a tenant, Liu Chun. It also provides information about the conceptual framework that shaped the “household-head”-nubi relationship. In fact, the legal deliberations that precede the actual description of the case tell us more about the paradigmatic “slave” (nubi 奴婢), as it was conceived within the legal framework of the Great Qing Code.

Moving away from the paradigmatic nubi to the story of Wu Yunzhu

Reading the story of Wu Yunzhu, the reader is expected to bear in mind the legal considerations that precede. They provide the subtext to her story.

The first sentence in Section 3 reads as follows: “Because her maidservant, Wu Yunzhu, had illicit sexual intercourse with Liu Chun who rented and farmed her land, Mrs. Niu Hulu expelled Liu Chun and exchanged Wu Yunzhu against a maidservant of Tuo Xinbao’s [Rong Hua’er]” (Niu Hulu shi yin shinü Wu Yunzhu yu zuzhong yidi whi Liu Chun tongjian, jiang Liu Chun nianzhu bing jiang Wu Yunzhu yu Tuo Xinbao shinü huhuan 鈕祜祿氏因使女烏雲珠與租種伊地之劉春通姦。將劉春攆逐。井將烏雲珠與托新保使女互換). This long sentence contains two “action verbs”: To “expel” (nianzhu 攆逐) and to “exchange” (huhuan 互換). Both action verbs have the same “actor” (Niu Hulu) and the same motivation (“illicit sexual relationship”, tongjian 通姦). They have two direct “target” persons (Wu Yunzhu and Liu Chun) and one indirect “target” person (Rong Hua’er). The actions result in three “exit” phases: two exits from a master-slave relation, both followed by a “re-entry” into the same relation with a different master, and one exit from a landlord-tenant relationship.

The semantic field of “coercion”, however, is almost completely absent from this section (and from the rest of the text). The two maidservants and the tenant - who may actually have perceived these actions affecting them as “coercive” - do not get to express themselves, even indirectly. The authors of the document, on their side, do not use a vocabulary that would convey meanings of constraint or coercion. Encapsulated in the Confucian worldview, human bondage was supposed to be a harmonious institution, where individuals knew their place in the hierarchy and accepted their role in society. Only “rebellious” or “ungrateful” nubi could disrupt the harmony, forcing masters, and eventually the state, to take corrective actions.

In the above-mentioned sentence, the only word that would convey a meaning of coercion, or at least a meaning of violence, is the verb nianzhu 攆逐, which means “to oust”, “to chase” or “to expel”. Liu Chun was chased from his tenure, obviously without having a word to say in the matter (all the affair was triggered by the resentment he felt for an action that was taken against him). To some extent, the use of this verb signals a “coerced exit” from a labour relation. However, this is the only coercive phase one can detect in Liu Chun’s story. As many tenants who “rented and farmed the land” of others, he may have been subject to many constraints that could have contributed to limit his autonomy and make him dependent (local practices of tenancy, fluctuant amounts of rent, undue extra-economic demands, debts, etc.). He may also have felt constrained to work as a tenant, facing few or no better options. Besides, the “forced exit” from his tenure may have left him with few choices but to accept more dependent labour relations, like hiring himself out as a daily or annual wage labourer. But his occupation and condition as a tenant would not have been inherently coercive, since this kind of relation would not produce a statutory asymmetry in late imperial Chinese context.

As for the two “maidservants”, on the contrary, coercion is not conveyed by the “action verbs” themselves, but 1. by the syntax that makes them passive “objects” of the actions taken by others, and 2. by our own understanding of the labels used to qualify them as being inherently linked to situations of coercion (i.e. by our understanding of nubi bondage as being a regime of coercion).

To “exchange” is not per se a coercive action, even when involving persons rather than objects. However, to exchange two maidservants without their consent (they had no say in the matter and no way to refuse it), all the more as a means to retaliate against the “unlawful” behavior of one of them, indeed reveals a situation of high heteronomy - and much likely of vulnerability to violence, to endless constraints and to labour exploitation. The mistress who undertook to separate the maidservant from the tenant may have felt forced to take such a radical measure, but it was also an act of power. Such an outright subjection to the power of others is precisely what we associate with the fact of being a nubi in the late imperial Chinese context. This is the reason why we immediately identify “coercion” in the use of such labels as nubi or shinü, despite the absence of words and verbs expressing “coercion”. In other words, “coercion” mostly hides in the labels of the present text. Still, even hidden in the labels, coercion unfolds in the very few actions taken to exit a coercive regime and its site of deployment, the household.

We don’t know why Rong Hua’er finally ran away (possibly because of repeated abuses or excessive labour, to marry someone, to try and make a living on her own, or even for a trivial disagreement with Mrs. Niu) and what she became afterward. However, “to run away” (taozou 逃走) was as serious an incrimination in Qing China as it was on an American slave plantation. If not an act of “resistance”, it was a “response” to coercion, whatever that coercion was (either because of violence, or because she was not allowed, as a nubi, to make a decision that mattered to her without her mistress’ consent). Rong Hua’er’s response to coercion was a risky and, we might assume, a successful one, unlike Wu Yunzhu’s - whose ultimate action eventually allowed her to exit enslavement, only to be coerced into penal servitude after a liminal period spent in jail.

Overall, the text only provides a limited number of action phrases expressing “coercion”. Most of our understanding of the coercive nature of the situation of nubi derives from our knowledge of nubi bondage as being a coercive regime. However, looking at the “action phrases” rather than at status or occupation labels allows us to move beyond this limited statement. It allows to restore some aspects of the dynamics and the logic of deployment of a power relation that involved “labour”, but was not limited to this sole dimension of interpersonal interactions. It not only allows to understand that Chinese nubi were coerced, but how coercion operated and why.

Selected action phrases

• The general cause-consequence statement on the effects of the action of “selling” a nubi on the existing bond with the “former master”. The “actor” is a paradigmatic “household-head” (blue), the “paradigmatic nubi” is the object of the action (green) and the verb is “to transfer by sale” (orange):
  • “With regard to household heads vis-à-vis their slaves, although name distinction is high, once sold, [the bond of] solidarity is severed.”
    以家長之於奴婢。名分雖尊。但一經轉賣。其義隨絕。
• The explanation as to why a sale would “sever the bond of obligation”, accompanied with a judgement on the compared effect of being redeemed or manumitted. Here, the paradigmatic “sold” nubi is the actor of two (involuntary) actions (to leave a former master and to find another one):
  • “Slaves who have been sold leave a master to find a new master. This is completely different from manumitted and redeemed slaves, for whom [the bonds of] benevolence and solidarity [with their former masters] remain.“
    蓋以被賣之奴婢。去一主而復一主。與放出及贖身奴婢尚有恩義未絕。迥不相同。
• The subsequent consequential clause expounding how the state should take action (the action here is “to set a sentence proposal”) when, in such a configuration, a slave would commit a crime. It contains two actions: the exchanged slaves actually “serves” their master; and the state (implied as the actor) would “set a sentence:
  • “Besides, once exchanged, both slaves serve their [new] masters. Would they commit any offence against their new master, the sentence shall naturally be set according to name distinction between master and slave.”
    況易換之後。奴婢各事其主。其後換之主稍有干犯。自應按主僕名分定擬。必不能以易換家奴稍從寬縱。
• The summary of the actual case (explained in more detail above):
  • “Because her maidservant, Wu Yunzhu, had illicit sexual intercourse with Liu Chun who rented and farmed her land, Mrs. Niu Hulu expelled Liu Chun and exchanged Wu Yunzhu against a maidservant of Tuo Xinbao’s [Rong Hua’er].“
    鈕祜祿氏因使女烏雲珠與租種伊地之劉春通姦。將劉春攆逐。井將烏雲珠與托新保使女互換。
• A short statement of the actions taken by the masters after they exchanged slaves (the actors, i.e. the masters are only implied):
  • Both were married to male slaves.
    各配僕人為妻。
• The short sentence about Rong Hua’er runaway:
  • “Until Rong Hua’er ran away.“
    嗣榮花兒逃走。
• The statement explaining why Mrs. Niu required the restitution of Wu Yunzhu after Rong Hua’er ran away (taking many actions such as going to Tuo’s house, requiring, claiming, and taking back):
  • “Suspecting that she took refuge in Tuo Xinbao’s home, Mrs. Niu Hulu went to Tuo Xinbao’s wife asking for the restitution [of Rong Hua’er], claiming that if Rong Hua’er was not there, she wanted to take Wu Yunzhu back.“
    鈕祜祿氏疑在托新保家藏匿。往向托新保之妻要人。並聲言如沒有榮花兒。欲將烏雲珠帶回。
• The sentence on the murder plotting, where action does not convey the meaning of coercion, but can be seen as a response to the initial coercive action of separating Wu Yunzhu and Liu Chun:
  • “Wu Yunzhu informed Liu Chun of the situation. Feeling resent for Mrs. Niu Hulu having expelled him, Liu Chun formulated the plan to kill [her] to vent his anger.“
    烏雲珠將情由向劉春告知。劉春因挾鈕祜祿氏攆逐之嫌。起意殺死洩忿。
• The actual circumstances of Mrs. Niu’s murder:
  • “When Mrs. Niu Hulu came to take Wu Yunzhu back, Liu Chun murdered Mrs. Niu Hulu as the carriage was crossing the doorways.“
    鈕祜祿氏赴托新保家將烏雲珠帶回。坐車出院。被劉春將鈕祜祿氏殺死。
• The two sentences on the actions the state should take to respond to the crime (here again, the implicit actor is the state):
  • “Liu Chun shall [therefore] be sentenced to death by decapitation awaiting in jail.“
    將劉春依謀殺人造意律斬監候。
  • “As an accessory who did not aid in the commission of the crime, Wu Yunzhu shall, according to the law, be sentenced to exile to 3.000 li and 100 strokes, and, following the heaviest penalty, be sent as a slave to the Oirats [in Mongolia].“
    烏雲珠依從而不加功律杖一百。流三千里。從重發額魯特為奴。